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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Defendants
were prosecuted and convicted of conspiring to engage in horserace bookmaking and related offenses. The police had secured evidence of defendants' activities by concealing a listening device in premises occupied by
them and also by unauthorized and forcible searches. The trial court admitted the evidence so obtained, notwithstanding the fact that the police
action in securing it was clearly in violation of both federal and state constitu tions1 and statutes.2 After conviction, the trial court denied defendants'
motion for a new trial. On appeal, held, reversed, three justices _dissenting.
Evidence obtained in violation of the defendants' constitutional rights is
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. People v. Cahan, (Cal. 1955) 282
P. (2d) 905.
The problem of admissibility of evidence obtained through unlawful
search and seizure has been considered by courts in virtually every jurisdiction.3 At common law, the general rule was. that such evidence was
admissible, 4 the courts reasoning that the means of procurement did not
effect its probative value. 5 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States condemns unlawful searches and seizures, but does not
expressly deal with the question of whether the fruits of such activity shall
constitute admissible evidence.6 However, the federal courts have long held
that evidence obtained by action in violation of that amendment is inadmissible. 7 In Wolf v. Colorado 8 the Court held that while the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures

U.S. CONST., amend. IV; CAL. CoNST., art. I, §19.
218 U.S.C. (1952) §§241, 242; Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1949) §146.
3 Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 33, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949).
4 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940).
5 This position was distinguished from those cases involving coerced confessions, which
were felt to be inherently unreliable. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §815 et seq. (1940).
6 The constitutions of every state contain provisions either exactly like or substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment. See CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 2d ed., §2
(1930), where such provisions are quoted for every state except New York, which adopted
one in 1938. N.Y. CONST., art. I, §12.
7 The rule was first suggested in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886),
and was laid down in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914).
s Note 3 supra. See Allen, "The ·wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and
the Civil Liberties,'' 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950).
l
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applicable to the states, it does not require that the states exclude evidence
obtained by such action. Later, the Court modified this concept by holding
that the presence of physical force would change the result. 9 In Irvine v.
California,1° a case also involving the use of a listening device, a closely
divided Court reaffirmed the Wolf decision and did not require that the
state court exclude the evidence. Prior to the decision in the principal case,
California had rejected the federal rule and admitted unlawfully obtained
evidence.11 In reversing its stand and adopting the exclusionary rule, the
court in the principal case admits that neither the federal nor state12 constitution requires exclusion, and that it is laying down "a judicially declared
rule of evidence."13 The court gives two reasons for its holding. First, it
reads the Wolf and Irvine cases as an invitation to the states to reexamine
their positions on the question. Secondly, the court indicates that, as a
matter of policy, the federal exclusionary rule is the only effective sanction
against constitutional violations by police officers. Strong policy arguments
can be made in support of either side of the admissibility problem, but it
is essentially a question of balancing the social desirability of apprehending
criminals against the protection of the individual's right to privacy.14 At
the time of the Wolf decision thirty-one states had held evidence obtained
through unlawful search and seizure admissible; sixteen had held it inadmissible.15 However, two of the states. which had judicially rejected the
exclusionary rule have now adopted it by statute,16 as has the heretofore
uncommitted jurisdictie>n.17 Since the Wolf case numerous courts have had
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381 (1954). Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Burton
dissented, the latter two on the ground that concealing a listening device in a bedroom
was sufficiently shocking to bring this case closer to Rochin v. California, note 9 supra,
than to Wolf v. Colorado, note 3 supra. Cf. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
62 S.Ct. 993 (1942).
11 People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 p_ 435 (1922). For the most recent statement
of this view, see In re Dixon, 41 Cal. (2d) 756, 264 P. (2d) 513 (1953).
12 CAL. CONST., art. I, §19, contains language similar to that of the Fourth Amendment.
13 Principal case at 910.
14 The policy arguments are beyond the scope of this note. On the side of admissibility, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2183, 2184 (1940); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.
13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); Waite, "Reasonable Search and Research," 86 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
623 (1938); Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," 42 MICH. L. REv. 679
(1944); Harno, "Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure,'' 19 ILL. L. REv. 303
(1925); Plumb, "Illegal Enforcement of the Law," 24 CoRN. L. Q. 337 (1939). On the
side of exclusion, see Allen, "The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the
Civil Liberties," 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950); 33 N.C. L. REv. 100 (1954); 58 YALE L. J. 144
(1948).
15 Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, note 3 supra.
16 N.C ..Gen. Stat. (1953) §§15-27; Te.x. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941; Supp. 1953)
§727a. See also Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 35, §§5, 5A (limiting the exclusionary
rule to prosecutions for misdemeanors); Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1953) tit. 29, §210 (making
evidence illegally obtained inadmissible in prosecutions for unlawful possession of liquor
in a private dwelling).
17 R.I. Acts & Resolves (1955) c. 3590. Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1949) §653h provides for criminal penalties for anyone, other than an authorized police officer, making
use of a listening device or secretly intercepting conversations. The court in the prin9
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an opportunity to reexamine their holdings, but only one has, like California, reversed a prior admissibility rule.18 Thus, admissibility is still the
majority position, but not to the extent that it once was. It should be
pointed out that the reversal of position by the California court involves a
change of mind by only two judges.19 It may be that the new majority
questions the durability of the Wolf-Irvine line of authority, 20 and does not
want to risk a possible overruling of those cases. The court in the principal
case admits that future difficulties may arise in the administration of the
federal rule and its many exceptions,21 but states that the absence of other
effective sanctions against unlawful searches and seizures justifies exclusion.22 A more satisfactory solution to the problem would be legislation,
either spelling out the exclusionary rule in sufficient detail that police
officers will know how to conduct themselves, or, preferably, providing other
effective sanctions against constitutional violations. 23

Neil Flanagin, S.Ed.

cipal case interpreted the clause to relieve authorized police officers from the operation
of that section, but not to legalize their acts in violation of the constitution.

18 Richards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 17 A. (2d) 199 (1950), overruling State v. Chuchola,
32 Del. 133, 120 A. 212 (1922). For decisions from 1949 to 1953, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed., §2183 (1940; Supp. 1953). Since then Illinois has reaffirmed its exclusionary rule
in People v. Perry, I Ill. (2d) 482, 116 N.E. (2d) 360 (1953), and New Jersey has reaffirmed its admissibility rule in In re 301-317 Clinton Ave., Newark, N.J., 35 N.J. Super.
136, 113 A. (2d) 208 (1955). Courts in the British Commonwealth generally follow the
admissibility rule, but there has been some divergence from this view in recent years.
See Cowen, "The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal Searches and
Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions," 5 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1952); Williams,
"Evidence Obtained by Illegal Means," 1955 CRIM. L. REv. 339.
19 The principal case was a 4-to-3 decision. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., joined
the two judges who dissented in In re Dixon, note 11 supra, to make up a new majority.
20 See note IO supra. Justice Clark reluctantly went along with the majority, feeling
bound by the Wolf case, but expressed dissatisfaction with the present rule. See 7 Au.
L. REv. 156 (1954).
21 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2184 (1940); 33 TEX. L. REv. 122 (1954).
22 Principal case at 911.
23 The possibility of state criminal or civil prosecution, or federal criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. (1952) §§241, 242, or a civil action under Rev. Stat. (1874) §1979,
42 U.S.C. (1952) §1983, are generally not felt to be a sufficient deterrent. See 38 CALIF.
L. ?lE"· 498 (1950); 7 STAN. L. REv. 76 (1954).

